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Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects

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  • Paul Heidhues
  • Nicolas Melissas

Abstract

We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects and discuss when they arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects. Formally, cohort effects lead to intra-period network effects being greater than inter-period network effects. Depending on the nature of the cohort effects, the dynamic game may or may not satisfy dynamic strategic complementarity. If it does, our model has a unique rationalizable outcome. Otherwise, there exists parameter values for which multiple equilibria arise because player have a strong incentive to invest at the same point in time others do. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Gleichgewichte in einem Dynamischen Globalen Spiel: Die Rolle von Kohorteneffekten) Koordinationsspiele haben typischerweise multiple Nashgleichgewichte mit sich selbsterfüllenden Erwartungen. Die Theorie der globalen Spiele führt Unsicherheit und private Informationen in statischen Koordinationsspielen ein und zeigt die Bedingungen auf, unter denen dies zu einem eindeutigen Gleichgewicht führt. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir ein Zweiperiodenspiel, in welchem die Spieler eine irreversible Investitionsentscheidung mit einer positiven Netwerkexternalität treffen. In der ersten Periode wählen die Spieler, ob sie sofort investieren oder auf bessere Informationen über das Projekt warten. Wir zeigen, dass Kohorteneffekte bei Technologiewahlproblemen mit positiven Netzwerkexternalitäten auftreten und untersuchen ihre Auswirkungen. Kohorteneffekte führen dazu, dass die Intraperioden-Netzwerkeffekte größer sind als die Interperioden-Netzwerkeffekte. Aus technischer Sicht bestimmen die Kohorteneffekte, ob das globale Spiel die Eigenschaft der dynamischen strategischen Komplemantarität erfüllt. Diese Eigenschaft wiederum impliziert, dass unser Modell eine eindeutige rationalisierbare Lösung hat. Ist diese Eigenschaft nicht erfüllt, so hat jeder Spieler einen hohen Anreiz zum gleichen Zeitpunkt wie die andern Spieler zu investieren. In diesem Fall exstieren Parameterwerte für welche unser Spiel multiple Nashgleichgewichtslösungen hat.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2003. "Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-08
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    Cited by:

    1. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2008. "Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 1-26, May.
    2. Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea, 2009. "Membership in citizen groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 217-232, September.
    3. Kováč, Eugen & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 298-320.
    4. Garth Heutel & Erich Muehlegger, 2015. "Consumer Learning and Hybrid Vehicle Adoption," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(1), pages 125-161, September.
    5. Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
    6. Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," FMG Discussion Papers dp600, Financial Markets Group.
    7. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (August 2006, with George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 279, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    10. Huang, Chong, 2017. "Defending against speculative attacks: The policy maker's reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 1-34.
    11. Xavier Vives, 2009. "Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 151-171, July.
    12. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Dzsamila Vonnak, 2018. "Multidimensional global games and some applications," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1803, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    14. Brindisi, Francesco & Çelen, Boğaçhan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2014. "The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 264-281.
    15. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    16. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 711-756, May.
    17. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.
    18. Jakub Steiner & Eugen Kovac, 2008. "Learning Options in Coordination Problems," 2008 Meeting Papers 848, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 367-379, May.
    20. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "Strategic delay in market entry," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 998-1014, August.
    22. Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2012. "Dynamic coordination with individual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 83-101.
    23. Dasgupta, Amil, 2007. "Coordination and delay in global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 195-225, May.
    24. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Global Game; Strategic Waiting; Coordination; Strategic Complementarities; Period-specific Network Effects; Equilibrium Selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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