Uncertainty Aversion and A Theory of Incomplete Contract
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More about this item
Keywords
uncertainty aversion; strategic uncertainty; coalitionformation; stability and core-criterion.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-05-09 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-05-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2014-05-09 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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