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Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model

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  • Rigotti, L.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

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  • Rigotti, L., 1998. "Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model," Discussion Paper 1998-128, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:5da27fed-fba0-49a9-b3de-db033dcd9f31
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/530486/128.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beaudry, Paul, 1994. "Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 821-832, November.
    2. Truman F. Bewley, 1989. "Market Innovation and Entrepreneurship: A Knightian View," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 905, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    4. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    8. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    9. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    10. Truman F. Bewley, 1987. "Knightian Decision Theory, Part II. Intertemporal Problems," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 835, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kelsey, David & Yalcin, Erkan, 2007. "The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 90-105, July.

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