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False Consensus in Economic Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Proto, Eugenio

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Sgroi, Daniel

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

In an incentivized experiment we identify a powerful and ubiquitous bias: individuals regard their own characteristics and choices as more common than is the case. We establish this "false consensus" bias in terms of happiness, political stance, mobile phone brand and on the attitude to deference in a hypothetical restaurant choice, and show that it is not limited to the distribution of hard to observe characteristics and choices but also to weight and height. We also show that the bias is not driven by the fact that the tallest, happiest, most left/right-wing, etc. are more salient. Key words: false consensus ; saliency ; biased beliefs ; happiness ; politics ; height, weight. JEL classification: D03 ; C83 ; D84

Suggested Citation

  • Proto, Eugenio & Sgroi, Daniel, 2011. "False Consensus in Economic Agents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 968, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:968
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. On false consensus
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2014-10-28 19:11:06

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    false consensus ; saliency ; biased beliefs ; happiness ; politics ; height; weight. jel classification: d03 ; c83 ; d84;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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