Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium
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- Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters: Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium," Economic Research Papers 269295, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Matthias Wrede, 2019. "The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 285-300, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Dynamically Consistent Choices ; Policy Commitment ; Voting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
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