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Competing Pressure Groups, Income Distribution and Growth

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  • Luciano MAURO

Abstract

This paper proposes an endogenous growth model that establishes a negative relationship between the concentration of the non cumulative factor, namely land but also natural resources in general, and long run growth and that offers a theoretical background for redistribution policies such as land reform. The present model has the advantage to link growth to wealth distribution independently of the formal political institution in the economy. In particular building upon some criticisms, both at the empirical and theoretical level, concerning the voting on fiscal policy approach, a different one is suggested here. The present scheme considers a framework in which two groups of agents, with different initial endowments, exert political pressure for a favourable taxation along the lines suggested by Becker (1983). The model defines an equilibrium growth rate for the output of the economy that is a negative function of the real tax rate on capital returns and ultimately of the fixed factor concentration. The rationale of the model lays upon the strong belief that the real cleavage in less developed countries is the one between status quo rent seeking groups and growth promoting groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano MAURO, "undated". "Competing Pressure Groups, Income Distribution and Growth," GE, Growth, Math methods 9603001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:9603001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roberto Perotti, 1993. "Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 755-776.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Growth, distribution and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 593-602, April.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Özler, Sule & Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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