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The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)

Author

Listed:
  • Uwe Dulleck

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

  • Joerg Oechssler

    (Humboldt University, Berlin)

Abstract

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to the end if one player is known to be absent-minded. In fact, it is sufficient that one player is known to be absent-minded with sufficiently high probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Uwe Dulleck & Joerg Oechssler, 1996. "The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)," Game Theory and Information 9610005, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Oct 1996.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610005
    Note: 8 pages, this revision actually contains Figure 1.
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
    2. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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