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An Evolutionary Bargaining Model

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  • Murali Agastya

    (University College London, London)

Abstract

Varying quantities of a single good can be produced using at least two and at most $n$ factors of production. The problem of allocating the surplus among the factors is studied in a dynamic model with adaptive behavior. Representatives for the factors (called players) make wage demands based on precedent and ignorant of each other's utilities for this good. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which the long-run equilibria coincide with the core allocations. A global convergence result is proved to show that players do learn to reach a core allocation in the long run. Moreover, allowing for the possibility of mistakes by the players, all the {\em stochastically stable outcomes} are characterized. The main result shows that in the limit, these stable allocations for a particular set of players converges to the allocation that maximizes the product of all the players' utilities over all core allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
    3. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
    7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    8. Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-1496, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Murali Agastya, 1995. "Perseverance, Information and Stochastically Stable Outcomes," Game Theory and Information 9503002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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