IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/stanec/97022.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann--Hildenbrand Macroeconomies

Author

Listed:
  • Peter J. Hammond

Abstract

May 1997 (Revised May 1998) By definition, multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms are immune to manipulation not only by individuals misrepresenting their preferences, but also by finite coalitions exchanging tradeable goods on the side. Continuum economies are defined in which both agents' identifiers and their privately known characteristics are joint i.i.d. random variables. For such economies, conditions are given for multilateral strategy-proofness to imply decentralization by a budget constraint with linear prices for tradeable goods and lump-sum transfers independent of individual characteristics. Also, adapting Aumann's (Econometrica, 1964) key proof avoids using Lyapunov's theorem or its corollary, Richter's theorem on integrating a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure. Journal of Economic Literature classifications: D50, D82. Keywords: Continuum economies, strategy-proofness, core equivalence.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Hammond, "undated". "Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann--Hildenbrand Macroeconomies," Working Papers 97022, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:97022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp97022.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haubrich, Joseph G. & King, Robert G., 1990. "Banking and insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 361-386, December.
    2. Jean-Paul Fitoussi (ed.), 1995. "Economics in a Changing World," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-23953-5, December.
    3. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 19-25, February.
    4. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1993. "Making a Miracle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 251-272, March.
    5. Bhattacharya, Rabindra Nath & Majumdar, Mukul, 1973. "Random exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 37-67, February.
    6. P.J. Hammond, 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.
    7. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1995. "Technical Progress in the Theory of Economic Growth," International Economic Association Series, in: Jean-Paul Fitoussi (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 5, pages 101-122, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October.
    9. Brown, Donald J & Robinson, Abraham, 1975. "Nonstandard Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(1), pages 41-56, January.
    10. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-580, May.
    11. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1988. "Optimal Financial Structure in Exchange Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 217-235, May.
    12. Weiss, Ernst-August Jr., 1981. "Finitely additive exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 221-240, October.
    13. Stern, Nicholas, 1991. "The Determinants of Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 122-133, January.
    14. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    15. Peter Hammond, 1995. "Four Characterizations Of Constrained Pareto Efficiency In Continuum Economies With Widespread Externalities," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 103-124, June.
    16. Yamazaki, Akira, 1981. "Diversified Consumption Characteristics and Conditionally Dispersed Endowment Distribution: Regularizing Effect and Existence of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 639-654, May.
    17. Gale, Douglas, 1980. "Money, information and equilibrium in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 28-65, August.
    18. Helpman, Elhanan, 1992. "Endogenous macroeconomic growth theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 237-267, April.
    19. Al-Najjar, Nabil Ibraheem, 1995. "Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1195-1224, September.
    20. Partha Dasgupta & Douglas Gale & Oliver Hart & Eric Maskin (ed.), 1992. "Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262541599, December.
    21. Yamazaki, Akira, 1978. "An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without Convexity Assumptions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 541-555, May.
    22. Grodal, Birgit, 1972. "A Second Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 581-583, May.
    23. Peter J. Hammond, 1987. "Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 399-412.
    24. Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 177-184, October.
    25. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-586, May.
    26. Anderson, Robert M., 1991. "Non-standard analysis with applications to economics," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 39, pages 2145-2208, Elsevier.
    27. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    28. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    29. Brown, Donald J. & Robinson, Abraham, 1974. "The cores of large standard exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 245-254, November.
    30. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    31. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-168, October.
    32. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September.
    33. repec:bla:scandj:v:95:y:1993:i:4:p:391-425 is not listed on IDEAS
    34. Feldman, Mark & Gilles, Christian, 1985. "An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 26-32, February.
    35. Frank Hahn, 1995. "On Growth Theory," International Economic Association Series, in: Jean-Paul Fitoussi (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 4, pages 85-100, Palgrave Macmillan.
    36. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter J. Hammond, 2003. "Equal rights to trade and mediate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 181-193, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. P.J. Hammond, 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.
    2. Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 295-309, December.
    3. Myrna Wooders, 2013. "Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 11-21, March.
    4. Peter J. Hammond, 2003. "Equal rights to trade and mediate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 181-193, October.
    5. Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 177-184, October.
    6. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
    7. Peter J. Hammond, 2017. "Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 1-50, January.
    8. Mongin, Philippe, 2019. "Interview of Peter J. Hammond," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 50, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    9. Sahm, Marco, 2006. "Essays in Public Economic Theory," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5633, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Javier Hervés-Estévez & Emma Moreno-García, 2015. "On restricted bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 631-645, August.
    11. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    12. Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2016. "Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 461-518.
    13. Robin Boadway, 1998. "The Mirrlees Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(1), pages 67-81, February.
    14. Furth, Dave, 1998. "The core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 433-472, November.
    15. Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "Incentive-compatibility in large games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-67, January.
    16. Rabault, Guillaume, 1999. "The Decomposition of Risk in Denumerable Populations with ex ante Identical Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 157-165, March.
    17. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
    18. Niccolò Urbinati, 2020. "Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities," Working Papers 07, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    19. Khan, M. Ali & Qiao, Lei & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 2020. "Modeling large societies: Why countable additivity is necessary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    20. Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma, 2014. "On bargaining sets for finite economies," MPRA Paper 62303, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Jul 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Continuum economies; strategy-proofness; core equivalence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:97022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/destaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.