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The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise

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  • Allen Hicken

Abstract

What explains the varying responses by Thai governments to changes in the international economic environment over time. To answer this the paper emphasizes the link between the nature of the political structure/policymaking environment and the government???s reform capacity. Thailand???s political structure typically undercuts the government???s reform capacity in two way. First, it is difficult to get needed reforms on the political agenda. Second, it is even harder to push reforms through the policy process to implementation. During the 1980s, Thailand was able to overcome some of the challenges inherent in its political system via an informal compromise between party politicians and technocratic reformers. This ???pork-policy compromise??? gave the government the capacity to adopt certain reforms???reforms that laid the foundation for the economic boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Changes in the political structure in the late 1980s brought an end to this compromise, thereby reducing the government???s reform capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen Hicken, 2004. "The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-638, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-638
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    File URL: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40024/3/wp638.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chhibber, Pradeep & Kollman, Ken, 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 329-342, June.
    2. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    3. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    4. Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, 1999. "The political economy of the Thai crisis," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 193-208.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    2. Paul Chambers, 2013. "Economic Guidance and Contestation: An Analysis of Thailand’s Evolving Trajectory of Development," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 32(1), pages 81-109.
    3. Apanard Angkinand & Thomas Willett, 2008. "Political influences on the costs of banking crises in emerging market economies: testing the U-shaped veto player hypothesis," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 279-297.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Thailand; reform; political economy; capacity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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