IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/9638.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Impact of PTAs on the Duration of Antidumping Protection

Author

Listed:
  • Prusa,Thomas J.
  • Zhu,Min

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. It employs a two-step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of preferential trade agreement membership on the original antidumping determination, and the second step estimates the impact of preferential trade agreement membership on the duration of duties. Several key findings emerge from the analysis. Most importantly, the duration of antidumping protection is significantly shorter for preferential trade agreement members, compared with targeted countries that are not preferential trade agreement members. The estimates imply that preferential trade agreement membership is associated with a 30 percent reduction in the duration of protection. Second, the impact on duration depends, in part, on whether the preferential trade agreement has rules specifically related to antidumping. On average, over all users and targeted countries, the impact on duration is about twice as large for preferential trade agreements with rules, compared with those with- out rules (and both have shorter duration than non-preferential trade agreement members). Third, the duration of antidumping measures has increased markedly over time, primarily due to cases in the right tail of the distribution. This is consistent with the widespread belief that the Uruguay Round's sunset review provisions did not produce the result that many World Trade Organization members sought, but it also reflects the growing fraction of cases targeting China. Although the rising fraction of cases against China partly explains why duration has increased, it does not explain the finding with respect to the impact of preferential trade agreements and duration.

Suggested Citation

  • Prusa,Thomas J. & Zhu,Min, 2021. "The Impact of PTAs on the Duration of Antidumping Protection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9638, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9638
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/608151619122450659/pdf/The-Impact-of-PTAs-on-the-Duration-of-Antidumping-Protection.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chad P. Bown & Patricia Tovar, 2016. "Preferential Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 262-294, November.
    2. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 8, pages 153-169, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 4, pages 45-65, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Tibor Besedeš & Thomas J. Prusa, 2017. "The Hazardous Effects Of Antidumping," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 9-30, January.
    6. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2005. "The Effects of," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 19(3), pages 407-424.
    7. Bhagwati, Jagdish & Panagariya, Arvind, 1996. "The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: Historical Evolution and Current Trends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 82-87, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Prusa, Thomas J. & Teh, Robert & Zhu, Min, 2022. "PTAs and the incidence of antidumping disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Min Zhu & Thomas J. Prusa, 2023. "The impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 553-592, May.
    2. Prusa, Thomas J. & Teh, Robert & Zhu, Min, 2022. "PTAs and the incidence of antidumping disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    3. Metiu, Norbert, 2021. "Anticipation effects of protectionist U.S. trade policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    4. Tovar, Patricia, 2019. "Preferential and multilateral liberalization: Evidence from Latin America’s use of tariffs, antidumping and safeguards," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    5. Tabakis, Chrysostomos & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2019. "Preferential trade agreements and antidumping protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
    7. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Michael O. Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2011. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 601-619, November.
    9. Chad P. Bown, 2010. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 281-337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(4), pages 877-890, April.
    11. Aksel Erbahar & Yuan Zi, 2015. "Cascading Trade Protection: Theory and Evidence from the U.S," CTEI Working Papers series 04-2015, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute.
    12. Pierce, Justin R., 2011. "Plant-level responses to antidumping duties: Evidence from U.S. manufacturers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 222-233.
    13. Crowley, Meredith & Meng, Ning & Song, Huasheng, 2018. "Tariff scares: Trade policy uncertainty and foreign market entry by Chinese firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 96-115.
    14. Lorenzo Trimarchi, 2020. "Trade Policy and the China Syndrome," Working Papers ECARES 2020-15, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    15. Bruno Mazzucco & Mauricio Bittencourt, 2022. "Does antidumping drive exporters out of the market? Some evidence from Brazil," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(12), pages 3833-3857, December.
    16. Meng, Ning & Milner, Chris & Song, Huasheng, 2020. "Antidumping and heterogeneous quality adjustment of multi-product firms: Evidence from Chinese exporters," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 147-161.
    17. Thomas J. Prusa, 2005. "The Growing Problem of Antidumping Protection," NBER Chapters, in: International Trade in East Asia, pages 329-366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Pierce, Justin R., 2011. "Plant-level responses to antidumping duties: Evidence from U.S. manufacturers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 222-233.
    19. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "What explains the proliferation of antidumping laws? [‘Antidumping Laws in the US; Use and Welfare Consequences’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 23(53), pages 94-138.
    20. Chad P. Bown & Paola Conconi & Aksel Erbahar & Lorenzo Trimarchi, 2020. "Trade Protection along Supply Chains," CESifo Working Paper Series 8812, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Trade and Trade Rules; Crime and Society; Human Rights; Rules of Origin; Trade Policy; Trade and Multilateral Issues;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9638. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.