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Do rules control power? GATT articles and arrangements in the Uruguay Round

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  • Finger, Michael J.
  • Dhar, Sumana

Abstract

Many complain and offer evidence that in recent years the GATT system has become more power-oriented, less stable, and less equitable. A concern to reverse this drift was one of the motives that brought the international community to agree to undertake the Uruguay Round. Rules control power, assumed the signers of the Punte del Este declaration, therefore elaborating and extending GATT rules would move the international community toward a fairer, more stable international trading system. Finger and Dhar contend that the opposite is true. Particularly in the 1980s, the elaboration and application of GATT rules has been an exercise in the application of economic and political power, not in its control. GATT rules, in theory, are there to limit national trade restrictions. Finger and Dhar contend that in fact things work the other way around: national practice comes first, and determines what the GATT rules mean. GATT's rules do not put limits on national practices, but provide international santion for these practices. Such rules are not part of the thereforelution but are part of the problem. Theirs is a situation-specific argument, say Finger and Dhar, not a generic one. Their target is not"rules", nor is it"GATT". Rather, it is the GATT rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, Michael J. & Dhar, Sumana, 1992. "Do rules control power? GATT articles and arrangements in the Uruguay Round," Policy Research Working Paper Series 818, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:818
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8338 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. repec:fth:michin:219 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Anjaria, Shailendra J, 1987. "Balance of Payments and Related Issues in the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 1(4), pages 669-688, September.
    5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8338 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Finger, J. Michael, 1990. "The GATT as international discipline over trade restrictions : a public choice approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 402, The World Bank.
    7. Jackson, J.H., 1988. "The Gatt Consistency Of Export Restraint Arrangements," Working Papers 219, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    8. Anonymous, 1958. "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 417-418, July.
    9. Brian Hindley, 1988. "Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 445-464, December.
    10. Finger, J Michael & Nogues, Julio, 1987. "International Control of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 1(4), pages 707-725, September.
    11. Anonymous, 1958. "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 261-263, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.

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