Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
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- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2013. "Economic analysis of products liability: Theory," Chapters, in: Jennifer H. Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, chapter 3, pages 69-96, Edward Elgar Publishing.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Baumann, Florian, 2015. "Freier Warenverkehr und unverfälschter Wettbewerb in der Europäischen Union: Der Beitrag der europäischen Produkthaftung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 75, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022.
"Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
- Ottaviani, Marco & Loseto, Marco, 2018. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 13224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Post-Print hal-03874153, HAL.
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03874153, HAL.
- Miceli Thomas J. & Segerson Kathleen, 2013. "Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and May Misperceive Risk," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 341-355, December.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Rasch, Alexander, 2015.
"The influence of product liability on vertical product differentiation,"
DICE Discussion Papers
182, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Alexander Rasch, 2015. "The Influence of Product Liability on Vertical Product Differentiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5315, CESifo.
- Tsvetanov, Tsvetan & Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2021. "Products liability with temptation bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 76-93.
- Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2022.
"The economics of platform liability,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 319-351, June.
- Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2021. "The Economics of Platform Liability," CESifo Working Paper Series 8919, CESifo.
- Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2022. "The Economics of Platform Liability," Post-Print hal-03711652, HAL.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2018.
"The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly,"
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2018-14, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2021. "The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly," Working Papers halshs-03502605, HAL.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2018. "The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly," Working Papers hal-03458358, HAL.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2018. "The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03458358, HAL.
- Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte, 2019.
"Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties,"
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- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte, 2019. "Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties," Working Papers hal-04141859, HAL.
- Andrea Castellano & Fernando Tohmé & Omar O. Chisari, 2020. "Product liability under ambiguity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 473-487, June.
- Brennan, Timothy J., 2015. "Holding distribution utilities liable for outage costs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 89-96.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016.
"Tort law under oligopolistic competition,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03459225, HAL.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2021. "Tort Law under Oligopolistic Competition," Working Papers halshs-03502604, HAL.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016. "Tort Law under Oligopolistic Competition," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-29, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016. "Tort law under oligopolistic competition," Working Papers hal-03459225, HAL.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Rasch, Alexander, 2016. "Why product liability may lower product safety," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 55-58.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Rebecca Rabon & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Liability versus Regulation for Controlling Product-Related Risks," Working papers 2012-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Arbatskaya, Maria & Aslam, Maria Vyshnya, 2018. "Liability or labeling? Regulating product risks with costly consumer attention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 238-252.
- Florian Baumann & Klaus Heine, 2013.
"Innovation, Tort Law, and Competition,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 703-719, December.
- Baumann, Florian & Heine, Klaus, 2012. "Innovation, tort law, and competition," DICE Discussion Papers 78, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Tim Friehe & Cat Lam Pham & Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(2), pages 149-169, September.
- Lam, Wing Man Wynne, 2016. "Attack-prevention and damage-control investments in cybersecurity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 42-51.
- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte, 2022.
"Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(1), pages 53-71, January.
- Schulte, Elisabeth & Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2021. "Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242339, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte, 2022. "Firm liability when third-parties and consumers incur cumulative harm," Post-Print hal-03352700, HAL.
- Christoph Rössler & Tim Friehe, 2020. "Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 295-312, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Products Liability; Safety; Contractural Liability; Strict Liability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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