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Comprehensive Planning: Is There a Relationship between Committee Design and Subsequent Outcome: A Baseline Survey

Author

Listed:
  • Heather Kohls

    (Marquette University)

  • Russell Kashian

    (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin - Whitewater)

Abstract

The design, structure and participants in the comprehensive planning process may be material to determining a plan’s success. Recognition of a relationship between process and outcome prompted the development of a state-wide online survey of Wisconsin planning professionals. This survey, provided to a group of Wisconsin planners who recently completed comprehensive plans, seeks to link the creation of committees with the subsequent support for the plan. The survey investigated structural aspects of the community plan, including committee composition, funding, consultants role, time frame, and history, as well as the perceptions of community input and cohesiveness. The survey continues with a look at implementation and change. As is common in the literature, “buyin” is crucial to the success of any plan. The model then attempts to link this concept of “buy-in” with outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Heather Kohls & Russell Kashian, 2006. "Comprehensive Planning: Is There a Relationship between Committee Design and Subsequent Outcome: A Baseline Survey," Working Papers 06-04, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uww:wpaper:06-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
    3. David Godschalk & Samuel Brody & Raymond Burby, 2003. "Public Participation in Natural Hazard Mitigation Policy Formation: Challenges for Comprehensive Planning," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(5), pages 733-754.
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