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A Theory of Intuition and Contemplation

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Balzer

    (University of Technology Sydney)

  • Benjamin Young

    (University of Technology Sydney)

Abstract

We introduce a model of intuition and contemplation in decision problems under uncertainty. Intuition is a garbling of true information and contemplation is the ability to recover the true informational content of signals. We define natural orders on the quality of intuition and on contemplative ability. In any non-strategic decision problem, the agent�s utility increases as either the quality of her intuition or her contemplative ability improves. We derive versions of Blackwell�s Informativeness Theorem for our intuitive agent and apply the model to the canonical Bayesian persuasion problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Balzer & Benjamin Young, 2020. "A Theory of Intuition and Contemplation," Working Paper Series 2020/01, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    • Handle: RePEc:uts:ecowps:2020/01
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    File URL: https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/2020-07/IntuitionandContemplationManuscript%5B1%5D_0_1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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