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Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation

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  • Andrei Barbos

    (Department of Economics, University of South Florida)

Abstract

We study a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent, who owns a project of unknown quality, considers proposing it to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation that differ in the benefits they deliver to the agent upon acceptance of a project. The agent has to select the tier to which the project is submitted for review. Making a proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form of a submission fee. We examine the effect of a change in the submission fees at the two tiers of evaluation on the expected quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Barbos, 2013. "Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation," Working Papers 0913, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:usf:wpaper:0913
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrei Barbos, 2014. "Imperfect evaluation in project screening," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 31-46, May.
    2. McLeod, Alex, 2021. "Discovery, disclosure, and confidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; Project Screening;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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