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Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls

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Abstract

Any electoral system has an electoral formula that converts vote proportions into parliamentary seats. Pre-electoral polls usually focus on estimating vote proportions and then applying the electoral formula to give a forecast of the parliament's composition. We here describe the problems arising from this approach: there is always a bias in the forecast. We study the origin of the bias and some methods to evaluate and to reduce it. We propose some rules to compute the sample size required for a given forecast accuracy. We show by Monte Carlo simulation the performance of the proposed methods using data from Spanish elections in last years. We also propose graphical methods to visualize how electoral formulae and parliamentary forecasts work (or fail).

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic Udina & Pedro Delicado, 2001. "Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls," Economics Working Papers 562, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:562
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benoit, Kenneth, 2000. "Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 381-388, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Garcia Montalvo & Omiros Papaspiliopoulos & Timothée Stumpf-Fétizon, 2018. "Bayesian forecasting of electoral outcomes with new parties' competition," Economics Working Papers 1624, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. José García-Montalvo & Omiros Papaspiliopoulos & Timothée Stumpf-Fétizon, 2018. "Bayesian Forecasting of Electoral Outcomes with new Parties' Competition," Working Papers 1065, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Jarosław Flis & Wojciech Słomczyński & Dariusz Stolicki, 2020. "Pot and ladle: a formula for estimating the distribution of seats under the Jefferson–D’Hondt method," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 201-227, January.
    4. Montalvo, José G. & Papaspiliopoulos, Omiros & Stumpf-Fétizon, Timothée, 2019. "Bayesian forecasting of electoral outcomes with new parties’ competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 52-70.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    d'Hondt rule; electoral formula; forecasting election results; Monte Carlo; sample size; seats apportion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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