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Taxless fiscal states: Lessons from 19th-century America and 21st-century China

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  • Yuen Yuen Ang

Abstract

How do modern fiscal states arise? Perhaps the most dominant explanation, based on the European experience, is that democratic institutions that limited the extractive power of states—exemplified by the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England—paved the way for the rise of fiscal capacity and subsequent prosperity. Revisionist accounts, however, reveal that this dominant narrative is flawed. In fact, numerous factors converged to enable the rise of European fiscal states, and in England, debt and land were particularly salient factors.

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  • Yuen Yuen Ang, 2022. "Taxless fiscal states: Lessons from 19th-century America and 21st-century China," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-26, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2022-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Public finance; Fiscal capacity; Land; United States; China;
    All these keywords.

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