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A Theory of Association: Social Status, Prices and Markets

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  • Kaushik Basu

Abstract

The utility from some 'commodities' depends on the allocation rule used to distribute it. If, for example, a prize for excellence in some field is given frequently to the highest bidders, its recipients would feel less happy than they would otherwise. Such goods are called association goods. It is argued that a wide range of commodities have an element of the association good in them and that for such commodities standard theory end prescriptions run into difficulty.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaushik Basu, 1987. "A Theory of Association: Social Status, Prices and Markets," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1987-020, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-1987-020
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/WP20.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Basu, Kaushik & Jones, Eric & Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1987. "The growth and decay of custom: The role of the new institutional economics in economic history," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-21, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuyan Zhang, 1989. "Economic System Reform in China," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1989-055, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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