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The Rule of Law, Legal Traditions, and Economic Growth in East Asia

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  • Meredith Woo-Cumings

Abstract

This paper examines the literature on the rule of law and economic development, and in particular the influential argument by La Porta et al., on the superiority of the Anglo-American common law system in fostering financial development. In this paper I show that however compelling their argument might be, legal traditions and institutions do not determine the nature of the state, nor its likely role in the economy—nor do they critically determine the course of economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Meredith Woo-Cumings, 2006. "The Rule of Law, Legal Traditions, and Economic Growth in East Asia," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-53, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2006-53
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2006-53.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Toye, 2006. "Modern Bureaucracy," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-52, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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