IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umamet/2007030.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The role of individual intertemporal transfers in dynamic TU-Games

Author

Listed:
  • Berden, C.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Berden, C., 2007. "The role of individual intertemporal transfers in dynamic TU-Games," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007030
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2007030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1300568/guid-926ed88d-6437-438a-975c-dc6e2c5cbd13-ASSET1.0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26481/umamet.2007030?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    2. Jerzy A. Filar & Leon A. Petrosjan, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(01), pages 47-65.
    3. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries, 2022. "Strategic transfers between cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 77-84.
    2. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. D. Bauso & J. Timmer, 2009. "Robust dynamic cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36, March.
    2. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
    4. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    5. Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
    6. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Konstantin Avrachenkov & Laura Cottatellucci & Lorenzo Maggi, 2013. "Cooperative Markov decision processes: time consistency, greedy players satisfaction, and cooperation maintenance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 239-262, February.
    8. Konstantin Avrachenkov & Laura Cottatellucci & Lorenzo Maggi, 2014. "Confidence Intervals for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index in Markovian Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 10-31, March.
    9. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
    10. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
    11. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
    12. Casajus, André & Kramm, Michael & Wiese, Harald, 2020. "Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    13. Engwerda, J.C., 2012. "Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study Of Macroeconomics of Climate Change," Other publications TiSEM cac36d07-227b-4cf2-83cb-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
    15. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Transferable utility games with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2126-2139, September.
    16. Habis, Helga & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2011. "Core concepts for incomplete market economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 595-609.
    17. Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2009. "Cooperation under incomplete contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    18. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    19. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    20. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Leonne Portz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.