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An empirical analysis of the role of risk aversion in executive compensation contracts

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  • Moers, F.

    (Accounting & Information Management)

  • Peek, E.

    (Accounting & Information Management)

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Suggested Citation

  • Moers, F. & Peek, E., 2000. "An empirical analysis of the role of risk aversion in executive compensation contracts," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2000045
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2000045
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    2. Banker, Rd & Datar, Sm, 1989. "Sensitivity, Precision, And Linear Aggregation Of Signals For Performance Evaluation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 21-39.
    3. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    5. Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 1993. "Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 3-23, April.
    6. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
    7. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df, 1987. "An Analysis Of The Use Of Accounting And Market Measures Of Performance In Executive-Compensation Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25, pages 85-129.
    8. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huatao Peng & Yuming Chang & Yang Liu, 2023. "Risk preference, prior experience, and serial entrepreneurship performance: evidence from China," Asia Pacific Business Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 613-631, May.
    2. Backhaus, J.G. & Hansen, R., 2000. "Resale price maintenance for books in Germany and the European Union: a legal and economic analysis," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Moers, F., 2000. "Financial and non-financial performance measures and managerial short-term orientation: the interactive effect of performance targets," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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