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Unemployment insurance design and its effects: evidence from the Uruguayan case

Author

Listed:
  • Verónica Amarante

    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Rodrigo Arim

    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Andrés Dean

    (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

Abstract

Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older.

Suggested Citation

  • Verónica Amarante & Rodrigo Arim & Andrés Dean, 2012. "Unemployment insurance design and its effects: evidence from the Uruguayan case," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-09, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-09-12
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4261
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lalive, Rafael, 2008. "How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration A regression discontinuity approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 785-806, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Linares Sánchez, Jose, 2020. "Efectos de las prestaciones por desempleo del Mecanismo de Protección al Cesante sobre la probabilidad de ocuparse en la formalidad y sobre la calidad de los emparejamientos [Effects of unemploymen," MPRA Paper 106698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Escudero, Verónica & López Mourelo, Elva & Pignatti, Clemente, 2020. "Joint provision of income and employment support: Evidence from a crisis response in Uruguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Buendía García, Luis & Sanabria Martín, Antonio, 2013. "Productive Structure, Political Cycle And Inequality: The Case Of Uruguay, 2004-2011," Revista Galega de Economía, University of Santiago de Compostela. Faculty of Economics and Business., vol. 22(ex).
    4. Amarante, Verónica & Gómez, Marcela, 2016. "El proceso de formalización en el mercado laboral uruguayo," Estudios y Perspectivas – Oficina de la CEPAL en Montevideo 39859, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    5. Gerard, François & Gonzaga, Gustavo, 2016. "Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program," CEPR Discussion Papers 11485, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Trine Filges & Anders Bruun Jonassen & Anne‐Marie Klint Jørgensen, 2018. "Reducing unemployment benefit duration to increase job finding rates: a systematic review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(1), pages 1-194.
    7. Luis Henrique Paiva & Santiago Falluh Varella, 2019. "The impacts of social protection benefits on behaviours potentially related to economic growth: a literature review," Working Papers 183, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
    8. Martin Leites & Sylvina Porras, 2013. "El enfoque de la Reacción en Cadena: una aplicación para explicar la dinámica del desempleo en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 13-11, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    9. Verónica Amarante & Andrés Dean, 2012. "Dinámica del mercado laboral uruguayo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-17, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    10. Verónica Alaimo & Mariano Bosch & David S. Kaplan & Carmen Pagés & Laura Ripani, 2015. "Jobs for Growth," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 90977, February.
    11. Andrés Dean & Estefaní­a Galván & Ivone Perazzo, 2014. "¿Acceden al subsidio por desempleo los asalariados rurales en Uruguay? Análisis de la situación actual y simulación de esquemas alternativos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 14-22, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    12. Yapor, Mijail & Amarante, Verónica & Arim, Rodrigo, 2015. "Desigualdad e informalidad en el Uruguay," Libros de la CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 39655, May.
    13. Bernardus Van Doornik & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion," Working Papers Series 483, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    14. -, 2016. "Hacia un desarrollo inclusivo: el caso del Uruguay," Coediciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 40494 edited by Cepal.
    15. Alaimo, Veronica & Bosch, Mariano & Kaplan, David S. & Pagés, Carmen & Ripani, Laura, 2015. "Jobs for Growth," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 7203, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment insurance; Impact evaluation;

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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