Does the obligation to bargain make you fit the mould? An experimental analysis
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Cited by:
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Elif Tosun, 2022. "Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-32, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; Conflicts; Enforcement; Forced negotiation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2016-09-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2016-09-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2016-09-04 (Law and Economics)
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