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On the formation of political coalitions

Author

Listed:
  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Clemens Puppe

Abstract

The paper analyses the process of coalition formation among political parties using game-theoretic concepts. Two different motives determining that process are distinguished: the parties' preferences over alternative policies and the politicians' desire to get into office. Based on these motives, two alternaives models of coalition formation are suggested. It is shown that in situations involving only a few political parties - such as, e.g., in Germany or Austria - office-seeking considerations may generate stable coalition structures. On the other hand, if the number of parties becomes too large, stable solutions exist only under rather restrictive additional conditions. Several examples are provided illustrating the theoretical implications of the analysis.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997. "On the formation of political coalitions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5915, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/5915
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 378, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6.
    3. M. Puy, 2013. "Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
    4. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie Swart, 2008. "Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 445-464, September.
    5. Patrik Eklund & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie Swart, 2008. "A consensus model of political decision-making," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 5-20, February.
    6. Jan-Willem Rijt, 2008. "An Alternative Model of the Formation of Political Coalitions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 81-101, February.
    7. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:12:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November.
    10. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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