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A consensus model of political decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • Harrie de Swart

    (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte-Logica en taalanalyse - Tilburg University [Netherlands])

  • Patrik Eklund

    (Department of Computing Science - Umeå University = Umeå Universitet)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrie de Swart & Patrik Eklund & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "A consensus model of political decision-making," Post-Print halshs-00283200, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00283200
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00283200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie de Swart & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, 2005. "A new model of coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 129-154, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gong, Zaiwu & Zhang, Huanhuan & Forrest, Jeffrey & Li, Lianshui & Xu, Xiaoxia, 2015. "Two consensus models based on the minimum cost and maximum return regarding either all individuals or one individual," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(1), pages 183-192.
    2. Vito Fragnelli, 2009. "The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 243-253, October.
    3. Jan-Willem Rijt, 2008. "An Alternative Model of the Formation of Political Coalitions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 81-101, February.
    4. González-Arteaga, T. & Alcantud, J.C.R. & de Andrés Calle, R., 2016. "A cardinal dissensus measure based on the Mahalanobis distance," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(2), pages 575-585.
    5. Meng, Fan-Yong & Gong, Zai-Wu & Pedrycz, Witold & Chu, Jun-Fei, 2023. "Selfish-dilemma consensus analysis for group decision making in the perspective of cooperative game theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 290-305.
    6. Zhou, Jian-Lan & Yu, Ze-Tai & Xiao, Ren-Bin, 2022. "A large-scale group Success Likelihood Index Method to estimate human error probabilities in the railway driving process," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    7. Rodríguez, Rosa M. & Labella, Álvaro & Nuñez-Cacho, Pedro & Molina-Moreno, Valentin & Martínez, Luis, 2022. "A comprehensive minimum cost consensus model for large scale group decision making for circular economy measurement," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).

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