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The Potential Role of Economic Cost Models in the Regulation of Telecommunications in Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Estache
  • D. Benitez
  • M. Kennet
  • Christian Ruzzier

Abstract

Worldwide privatization of the telecommunications industry and the introduction of competition in the sector, altogether with the ever-increasing rate of technological advance in telecommunications, raise new and critical challenges for regulation. For matters of pricing, universal service obligations, and the like, one of the key questions to be answered is: “What is the efficient cost of providing the service to a certain area or type of customer?” As developing countries move forward with their efforts to build up their capacity to regulate their privatized infrastructure monopolies, cost models are likely to prove increasingly important in answering this question. Costs models deliver a number of benefits to a regulator willing to apply them, but they also ask for something in advance: information. Without this vital element no answer can be given to the question posed above. In this paper, we will introduce cost models and establish their applicability when different degrees of information are available to the regulator. The latter is accomplished by running the model with different sets of actual data from Argentina’s second largest city and comparing the results. Reliable and detailed information is generally a scarce good in developing countries, and we establish here the minimum information requirements that a regulator needs to implement a cost proxy model approach, showing that this ‘data constraint’ need not be that binding.
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Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & D. Benitez & M. Kennet & Christian Ruzzier, 2002. "The Potential Role of Economic Cost Models in the Regulation of Telecommunications in Developing Countries," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43987, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/43987
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Iimi, Atsushi, 2007. "Price structure and network externalities in the telecommunications industry : evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4200, The World Bank.
    2. Rossi, Martín, 2000. "Análisis de eficiencia aplicado a la regulación ¿Es importante la Distribución Elegida para el Término de Ineficiencia?," UADE Textos de Discusión 22_2000, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    3. Canay, Iván, 2002. "Eficiencia y Productividad en Distribuidoras Eléctricas: Repaso de la Metodología y Aplicación," UADE Textos de Discusión 35_2002, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    4. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024.
    5. Rossi, Martín, 2000. "Midiendo el valor social de la calidad de los servicios públicos: el agua," UADE Textos de Discusión 20_2000, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    6. Greco, Esteban & Stanley, Leonardo, 2004. "Valuación de Activos, Tarifas e Incentivos: La base de capital en las empresas reguladas y la renegociación contractual," UADE Textos de Discusión 55_2004, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    7. Antonio Estache & Sergio Perelman & Lourdes Trujillo, 2006. "Infrastructure Reform in Developing Economies: Evidence from a survey of efficiency measures," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44062, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Romero, Carlos, 2010. "Servicio Universal en el proceso de privatización de las empresas de telecomunicaciones y agua potable y alcantarillado en el Paraguay," UADE Textos de Discusión 34_2001, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    9. Ferro, Gustavo, 2001. "Participación del Sector Privado y Regulación en Agua y Saneamiento en Argentina: Casos Seleccionados," UADE Textos de Discusión 30_2001, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    10. Schoentgen, Aude & Gille, Laurent, 2017. "Valuation of telecom investments in sub-Saharan Africa," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 537-554.
    11. Tim Coelli & Denis Lawrence (ed.), 2006. "Performance Measurement and Regulation of Network Utilities," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3801.
    12. Galetovic, Alexander & Mueller, Bernardo, 2002. "Comments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123202, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Roitman, Mauricio & Ferro, Gustavo, 2003. "La concesión de Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe," UADE Textos de Discusión 43_2003, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    14. Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Bragança, 2005. "A Remuneração de Redes nas Telecomunicações e a Nova Orientação a Custos: Avaliação e Perspectivas Para a Telefonia Fixa Brasileira," Discussion Papers 1104, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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