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Des enchères comme révélateurs de classement des vins

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  • Victor Ginsburgh
  • Albert Di Vittorio

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Suggested Citation

  • Victor Ginsburgh & Albert Di Vittorio, 1996. "Des enchères comme révélateurs de classement des vins," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/152439, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/152439
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    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/152439/1/encheres.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krasker, William S, 1979. "The Rate of Return to Storing Wines," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1363-1367, December.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    3. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gergaud, Olivier & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2010. "Natural Endowments, Production Technologies and the Quality of Wines in Bordeaux. Does Terroir Matter?," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 3-21, April.
    2. Dimson, Elroy & Rousseau, Peter L. & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2015. "The price of wine," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 431-449.
    3. Florine Livat, 2007. "Mesure des interactions de prix : une analyse des modalités de substitution parmi sept vins de Bordeaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 180(4), pages 127-145.
    4. Héla Hadj Ali & Céline Nauges, 2003. "Vente en primeur et investissement : une étude sur les grands crus de Bordeaux," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 159(3), pages 93-103.
    5. Victor Ginsburgh & Olivier Gergaud, 2005. "La qualité des vins de Brodeaux se résume-t-elle uniquement à celle de son terroir?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5273, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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