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Does Forced Voting Result in Political Polarization?

Author

Listed:
  • Fernanda L L de Leon

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Renata Rizzi

    (Universidad de Sao Paulo)

Abstract

This paper estimates effects of exposure to compulsory voting on individuals' political preferences, through a regression discontinuity framework. These results are important to understand effects of a voting system transition. The identification comes from Brazil's dual voting system: voluntary and compulsory. Using self-collected data, we find that compulsory voting legislation has sizeable effects on individuals' political preferences, making them more likely to identify with a political party, to become extreme oriented and to move to the left.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernanda L L de Leon & Renata Rizzi, 2014. "Does Forced Voting Result in Political Polarization?," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 064, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_64
    as

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    File URL: https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/afe/UEA-AFE-064.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 281-355, June.
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    6. Gerber, Alan S. & Huber, Gregory A. & Washington, Ebonya, 2010. "Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 720-744, November.
    7. Ebonya Washington & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2009. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 86-111, January.
    8. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2009. "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-291, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaebler, Stefanie & Potrafke, Niklas & Roesel, Felix, 2020. "Compulsory voting and political participation: Empirical evidence from Austria," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Stefanie Gäbler & Niklas Potrafke & Felix Rösel, 2017. "Compulsory Voting, Voter Turnout and Asymmetrical Habit-formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6764, CESifo.

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