IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/udc/wpaper/wp538.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentives in Three-Sided Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Arenas
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Abstract

In a class of three-sided matching problems in which the core is non-empty, we show that no stable mechanism is strategy-proof for those who internalize the trilateral structure of the market in their preferences. This impossibility is related to the incompatibility between stability, one-sided strategy-proofness, and one-sided non-bossiness in two-sided markets. Furthermore, unlike what happens in marriage markets, strong restrictions on preferences are needed to ensure that stability and one-sided strategy-proofness are compatible for each market side.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Arenas & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2022. "Incentives in Three-Sided Markets," Working Papers wp538, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp538
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/3a5f8639aea12a63ca7321ed58c675af1b3517b2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp538. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohit Karnani (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuclcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.