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Jürgen G. Backhaus, editor, The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999) pp. xii, 548, $200.00. ISBN 1 8589 8516 1

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  • Pearson, Heath, 2001. "Jürgen G. Backhaus, editor, The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999) pp. xii, 548, $200.00. ISBN 1 8589 8516 1," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 388-389, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jhisec:v:23:y:2001:i:03:p:388-389_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    3. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
    6. Steven Shavell, 2000. "On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 25(2), pages 166-179, April.
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