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From Tranquility to Secession and Other Historical Sequences: A Theoretical Exposition

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Hallwood

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

A model is developed explaining many common historical sequences: inter alia, the rise and fall of empires, expansion or contraction in the geographic size of nations, wars of secession, non-contested secessions, and growth of supra-national unions. The basic unit of analysis is a transaction in international (or national) law that verifies and legitimizes transformations from one organizational entity to another. Decision-makers for national, or super-national entities as well as those at sub-levels are assumed to be welfare maximizers under cost constraints. Potential secessionists face dispute costs, and decision-makers for the higher-level entity incur persuasion costs. Both costs may include military expenses. These transaction costs are shown to play a crucial role in determining the optimal number of independent countries in the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hallwood, 2007. "From Tranquility to Secession and Other Historical Sequences: A Theoretical Exposition," Working papers 2007-35, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-35
    as

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    File URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2007-35.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. N. H. Bingham, 2004. "Book reviews," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 167(4), pages 767-768, November.
    2. N. H. Bingham, 2004. "Book reviews," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 167(4), pages 761-762, November.
    3. R. Boadway, 2004. "Book Reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 95-98, September.
    4. J. Wesley Leckrone, 2004. "Book Reviews," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 34(4), pages 264-173, Fall.
    5. Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-283, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Hallwood, 2008. "Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom," Working papers 2008-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    autonomous regions; causes of war; civil war; clash of civilizations; collapse of empire; economic union; empire; end of history; federalism; human rights; international borders; secession; self determination; theory of history; transaction costs; unitary state; war of secession.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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