IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uct/uconnp/2004-38.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

  • C. F. Sirmans

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Developers attempting land assembly often face a potential holdout problem that raises the cost of development. To minimize this extra cost, developers will prefer land whose ownership is less dispersed. This creates a bias toward development at the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in urban sprawl. This paper examines the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discusses possible remedies.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2004. "The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl," Working papers 2004-38, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-38
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2004-38.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brueckner, Jan K., 1997. "Infrastructure financing and urban development:: The economics of impact fees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 383-407, December.
    2. Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-362, June.
    3. Jan K. Brueckner, 2000. "Urban Sprawl: Diagnosis and Remedies," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 23(2), pages 160-171, April.
    4. McFarlane, Alastair, 1999. "Taxes, Fees, and Urban Development," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 416-436, November.
    5. Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
    6. O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1994. "Land assembly and urban renewal," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-300, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Chris Cunningham, 2013. "Estimating the holdout problem in land assembly," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2013-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C.F., 2007. "The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 309-319, November.
    2. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    4. J. Peter Clinch & Eoin O'Neill, 2010. "Assessing the Relative Merits of Development Charges and Transferable Development Rights in an Uncertain World," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(4), pages 891-911, April.
    5. J. Peter Clinch & Eoin O'Neill, 2010. "Designing Development Planning Charges: Settlement Patterns, Cost Recovery and Public Facilities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(10), pages 2149-2171, September.
    6. Winn, Abel M. & McCarter, Matthew W., 2018. "Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 176-185.
    7. Jou, Jyh-Bang, 2012. "Efficient growth boundaries in the presence of population externalities and stochastic rents," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 349-357.
    8. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
    9. John I. Carruthers & Gudmundur F. Úlfarsson, 2008. "Does `Smart Growth' Matter to Public Finance?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 45(9), pages 1791-1823, August.
    10. Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
    11. Jana, Arnab & Basu, Rounaq & Mukherjee, Conan, 2020. "A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    12. Brueckner, Jan K. & Helsley, Robert W., 2011. "Sprawl and blight," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 205-213, March.
    13. Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac, 2012. "Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 793-814.
    14. Rhoads, Thomas A. & Shogren, Jason F., 2006. "Why do cities use supply side strategies to mitigate traffic congestion externalities?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 214-219, August.
    15. Gyourko, Joseph & Molloy, Raven, 2015. "Regulation and Housing Supply," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1289-1337, Elsevier.
    16. Lönnroth, Tea & Krigsholm, Pauliina & Falkenbach, Heidi & Oikarinen, Elias, 2024. "Advancing understanding of the linkages between local land policy interventions and the responsiveness of housing supply: Intervention mechanisms in the Finnish context," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    17. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
    18. Parente, Michael D. & Winn, Abel M., 2012. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 475-490.
    19. Mayer, Christopher J. & Somerville, C. Tsuriel, 2000. "Land use regulation and new construction," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 639-662, December.
    20. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Urban sprawl; holdout problem; urban renewal; public use;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mark McConnel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuctus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.