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Incumbent-Quality Advantage and Counterfactual Electoral Stagnation in the U.S. Senate

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Pastine

    (University College Dublin)

  • Tuvana Pastine

    (NUI Maynooth)

  • Paul Redmond

    (NUI Maynooth)

Abstract

This paper presents a simple statistical exercise to provide a benchmark for the degree of electoral stagnation without direct officeholder benefits or challenger scare-off effects. Here electoral stagnation arises solely due to incumbent-quality advantage where the higher quality candidate wins the election. The simulation is calibrated using the observed drop-out rates in the U.S. Senate. From 1946 to 2010, the observed incumbent reelection rate is 81.7 percent; the benchmark with incumbent-quality advantage alone is able to generate a reelection rate of 78.2 percent. In the sub-sample from 1946 to 1978, the reelection rate from the simulation is almost identical to the observed. The rates diverge in the second part of the sub-sample from 1980 to 2010, possibly indicating an increase in electoral stagnation due to incumbency advantage arising for reasons other than incumbent-quality advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine & Paul Redmond, 2012. "Incumbent-Quality Advantage and Counterfactual Electoral Stagnation in the U.S. Senate," Working Papers 201218, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201218
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    File URL: http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP12_18.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Matthew F. Mitchell & Andrea Moro, 2008. "Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-798, August.
    3. Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2009. "Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 292-306, April.
    4. Walter J. Stone & L. Sandy Maisel & Cherie D. Maestas, 2004. "Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 479-495, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Redmond, Paul & Regan, John, 2015. "Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 244-256.

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    Keywords

    Incumbent-Quality Advantage; Counterfactual Electoral Stagnation;

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