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Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition

Author

Listed:
  • Abderrahmane ZIAD

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS))

  • Samir SBABOU

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS))

  • Hatem SMAOUI

    (CEMOI, Université de la Réunion)

Abstract

We define a new class of games, which we qualify as congestion games with exact partition. These games constitute a subfamily of singleton congestion games for which the players are restricted to choose only one strategy, but they each possess their own utility function. The aim of this paper is to develop a method leading to an easier identification of all Nash equilibria in this kind of congestion games. We also give a new proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this type of games without invoking the potential function or the finite best-reply property.

Suggested Citation

  • Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, 2011. "Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201115, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
  • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201115
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Voorneveld & Peter Borm & Freek Van Megen & Stef Tijs & Giovanni Facchini, 1999. "Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 283-299.
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    3. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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    5. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Strong Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a07, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Singleton congestion games; Nash equilibria; Potential function; Finite best-reply property.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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