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The "Veblen" Effect, Targeted Advertising and Consumer Welfare

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Listed:
  • Lynne Pepall
  • Joseph Reiff

Abstract

The technology of advertising in the twenty-first century allows for better targeting of consumers and better identification of consumer subgroups in the population. This makes it easier for firms to create in their advertising a desire to belong to the group identified with a product. We explore this kind of advertising in a monopoly model. The firm has an incentive to target this kind of advertising to the most lucrative segment of a particular social grouping and while advertising does create value for the consumer, it leads to an outcome where less output is sold at a higher price in a narrower or more segmented market than in the standard monopoly model. As a result even though consumers value the identification effect they are worse off. This is because the firm uses advertising to exploit a form of price discrimination and appropriate more surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Lynne Pepall & Joseph Reiff, 2016. "The "Veblen" Effect, Targeted Advertising and Consumer Welfare," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0815, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  • Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0815
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1993. "A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(4), pages 941-964.
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    3. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2002. "Comsumption Externalities, Coordination, and Advertising," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 919-943, August.
    4. C. Robert Clark & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2005. "Advertising and Coordination in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 377-401, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Targeted Advertising; Peer Effects; Monopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising

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