A Cheap-talk Model with Multiple Free-riding Audiences: Reference to Global Environmental Protections
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap Talk; Externality; Environmental Protections;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-08-16 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-ENE-2014-08-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2014-08-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2014-08-16 (Microeconomics)
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