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Competition in the media market and confirmatory news

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  • Panova, Elena

Abstract

This paper extends reputational cheap-talk model to study the effect of competition in the media on quality of news. We find that competition helps sustaining informative reporting when it covers is-sues on which the follow-up quality assessment is likely to be possible, such as various forecasts. However, it increases the elasticity of demand and thereby creates the incentives to confirm the common priors on controversial issues, such as politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Panova, Elena, 2024. "Competition in the media market and confirmatory news," TSE Working Papers 24-1597, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:129948
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Graham Beattie & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Ananya Sen, 2021. "Advertising Spending and Media Bias: Evidence from News Coverage of Car Safety Recalls," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 698-719, February.
    2. Cagé, Julia, 2020. "Media competition, information provision and political participation: Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    3. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2010. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 35-71, January.
    4. Jacopo Perego & Sevgi Yuksel, 2022. "Media Competition and Social Disagreement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 223-265, January.
    5. Jeremy Burke, 2008. "Primetime Spin: Media Bias and Belief Confirming Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 633-665, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    quality of news; competition; reputational cheap-talk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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