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Persuasion in social media: smoke and mirrors

Author

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  • Prabal Roy Chowdhury

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)

Abstract

In the presence of individuals who think `categorically', we demonstrate that profit-maximizing social media platforms indulge in identity-based censoring, with nature of bias depending on the efficiency of the other epistemic institutions (EIs) of the society. In general, when the EIs are neither very efficient, nor very inefficient, the optimal strategy involves a mixture of confirmatory and (a minimal amount of) contrarian reporting, with the contrarian elements being used to create a false perception that no news is good news, which in turn allows the platform to camouflage the fact that it is suppressing all but one unwelcome signals. Further, public good implementation is inefficient if and only if the other epistemic institutions are inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2024. "Persuasion in social media: smoke and mirrors," Discussion Papers 24-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  • Handle: RePEc:alo:isipdp:24-03
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    File URL: https://www.isid.ac.in/~epu/dispapers/dp24_03.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social media; confirmation bias; contrarianism; identity-based censoring; categorical thinking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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