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Stakeholder Orientation and Capital Structure: Social Enterprises Versus For-profit Firms in the Italian Social Residential Service Sector

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  • Alessandro Fedele
  • Raffaele Miniaci

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate whether capital structure differs between for-profit and nonprofit sectors by focusing on two key aspects of the latter: the non-distribution constraint and the stakeholder oriented governance system. We develop a theoretical model and show that the former negatively affects leverage, defined as the amount borrowed over the total investment, whilst the latter has a positive effect. We then analyze a longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 800 firms operating in the social residential sector in Italy and show that, once controlled for observable characteristics, for-profit companies have a leverage 18% higher than nonprofit enterprises, even if the latter face lower credit costs. We explain this finding by arguing that the effect of the non-distribution constraint prevails over the effect of stakeholder orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, 2012. "Stakeholder Orientation and Capital Structure: Social Enterprises Versus For-profit Firms in the Italian Social Residential Service Sector," Euricse Working Papers 1233, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpeu:1233
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlo Borzaga & Sara Depedri & Ermanno Tortia, 2010. "The Growth of Organizational Variety in Market Economies: The Case of Social Enterprises," Euricse Working Papers 1003, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    2. Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, 2010. "Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Investments Differently from For-profit Firms? The Case of Social Residential Services in Italy," Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 174-189, October.
    3. Brekke, Kurt Richard & Siciliani, Luigi, 2011. "Quality competition with profit constraints: Do non-profit firms provide higher quality than for-profit firms?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
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    6. Lorenz NETT, 1993. "Mixed Oligopoly With Homogeneous Goods," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 367-393, July.
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    8. Fedele , Alessandro & Miniaci, Raffaaele, 2010. "Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Investments Differently from For-proft Firms?," AICCON Working Papers 72-2010, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    for-profit and nonprofit enterprises; capital structure; non-distribution constraint; stakeholder orientation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General

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