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The circulation of worthless objects aids cooperation. An experiment inspired by the Kula

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Listed:
  • Giuseppe Danese
  • Luigi Mittone

Abstract

Many anthropological records exist of apparently worthless objects used in traditional societies, often part of larger institutional arrangements that were instrumental in favoring cooperation and reducing conflict. The most famous examples of such objects are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment subjects can send a token to another participant before each round of a repeated public good game. We use as tokens a bracelet built by the participants, a piece of cardboard provided by the experimenter, and an object brought from home by the participants. Contributions to the public good in the treatments featuring a bracelet and cardboard are significantly higher than in a control study. The home object was not equally useful in increasing contributions. Notwithstanding the cheap talk nature of the decision to send the token, both sending and receiving the token are associated with a significant increase in contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2017. "The circulation of worthless objects aids cooperation. An experiment inspired by the Kula," CEEL Working Papers 1703, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:1703
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kula; worthless objects; cooperation; public goods games; signaling; kitoum;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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