A Description of Experimental Tax Evasion Behavior Using Finite Automata: the case of Chile and Italy
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Edoardo Di Porto & Leandro Elia & Cristina Tealdi, 2013. "The "emersion" effect: an ex post and ex ante social program evaluation on labor tax evasion in Italy," Working Papers 2/2013, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Jun 2013.
- Garrido, Nicolás & Mittone, Luigi, 2013. "An agent based model for studying optimal tax collection policy using experimental data: The cases of Chile and Italy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 24-30.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PBE-2008-10-21 (Public Economics)
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