Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007.
"Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476.
- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society.
- Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007.
"A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1449-1477, August.
- Martin Hellwig, 2005. "A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Martin Hellwig, 2007. "A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Maurice Marchand, 2000.
"Optimal Income Taxation With Quasi‐Linear Preferences Revisited,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 435-460, October.
- Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Maurice Marchand, 1999. "Optimal Income Taxation With Quasi-linear Preferences Revisited," Working Paper 984, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- BOADWAY, Robin & CUFF, Katherine & MARCHAND, Maurice, 2000. "Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1466, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987.
"Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042,
Elsevier.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987. "Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 2189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993.
"Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-478, August.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Paper 828, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Guesnerie,Roger, 1998. "A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521629560, September.
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004.
"Optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and public-sector pricing : a contribution to the foundations of public economics,"
Papers
04-42, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Jean‐Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 399-438, October.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997.
"Collusion under Asymmetric Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
- Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- J.J. Laffont & D. Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under asymmetric information [[Collusion en information asymétrique]]," Post-Print hal-02686625, HAL.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982.
"Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1981. "Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
- Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 319-334, May.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 2004. "Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-35, April.
- repec:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:4:p:435-60 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gabrielle Demange & Roger Guesnerie, 2005.
"On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms,"
Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 419-440,
Springer.
- Gabrielle Demange & Roger Guesnerie, 2001. "On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 367-389.
- Gabrielle Demange & Roger Guesnerie, 2001. "On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms," Post-Print halshs-00670900, HAL.
- Ehud Kalai, 2004.
"Large Robust Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
- Ehud Kalai, 2002. "Large Robust Games," Discussion Papers 1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
- Weymark, John A., 1986. "A reduced-form optimal nonlinear income tax problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 199-217, July.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Felix Bierbrauer, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 311-342, April.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_39, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 2701, CESifo.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_6, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix J. Bierbrauer, 2014. "Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy with Aggregate Uncertainty," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 205-257, February.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Sahm, Marco, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 159, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bierbrauer Felix J., 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?: Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und Optimale Steuern," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 2-24, April.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2023.
"Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 237-263, January.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2023. "Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules," Post-Print hal-03550894, HAL.
- Martin Hellwig, 2004.
"Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics,"
Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and public-sector pricing : a contribution to the foundations of public economics," Papers 04-42, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Mathias Hungerbühler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2006.
"Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 743-767.
- Hungerbühler, Mathias & Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2005. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," IZA Discussion Papers 1460, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Mathias Hungerbuehler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno van Der Linden, 2006. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," Post-Print hal-01248161, HAL.
- Robin Boadway, 1998. "The Mirrlees Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(1), pages 67-81, February.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007.
"A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1449-1477, August.
- Martin Hellwig, 2005. "A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Martin Hellwig, 2007. "A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007.
"The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux pricing versus bundling,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 511-540, April.
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bierbrauer, Felix J. & Boyer, Pierre C., 2013.
"Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-14.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_45, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bierbrauer, F.J. & Boyer, F.J., 2011. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1108, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Felix J. Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political Competition and Mirrleesian Income Taxation: A First Pass," CESifo Working Paper Series 3294, CESifo.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007.
"The undesirability of randomized income taxation under decreasing risk aversion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 791-816, April.
- Martin Hellwig, 2005. "The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_27, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
More about this item
Keywords
Income Taxation; Public Good Provision; Revelation of Preferences; Two-dimensional Heterogeneity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PBE-2006-03-05 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-03-05 (Public Finance)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:97. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tamilla Benkelberg (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.