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Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending

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  • Hainz, Christa
  • Kleimeier, Stefanie

Abstract

We develop a double moral hazard model that predicts that the use of project finance increases with both the political risk of the country in which the project is located and the influence of the lender over this political risk exposure. In contrast, the use of project finance should decrease as the economic health and corporate governance provisions of the borrower’s home country improve. When we test these predictions with a global sample of syndicated loans to borrowers in 139 countries, we find overall support for our model and provide evidence that multilateral development banks act as “political umbrellas†.

Suggested Citation

  • Hainz, Christa & Kleimeier, Stefanie, 2006. "Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 183, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonetti, Veronica & Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano, 2010. "Offtaking agreements and how they impact the cost of funding for project finance deals: A clinical case study of the Quezon Power Ltd Co," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 60-71, April.
    2. Müllner, Jakob, 2016. "From uncertainty to risk—A risk management framework for market entry," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 800-814.
    3. Dorobantu, Sinziana & Müllner, Jakob, 2019. "Debt-side governance and the geography of project finance syndicates," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-179.
    4. Jakob Müllner, 2017. "International project finance: review and implications for international finance and international business," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 97-133, April.
    5. Jakob Müllner & Sinziana Dorobantu, 2023. "Overcoming political risk in developing economies through non-local debt," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(2), pages 159-181, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    project finance; syndicated loans; political risk; double moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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