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The Divorce of Ownership from Control from 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Historical Trends

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  • Leslie Hannah

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

In 1900 US business corporations were dominated by plutocratic family owners, while British and French quoted companies more commonly divorced ownership from control. 'Democratic' corporate governance rules explain some of Europe's precocity and London's exceptional listing requirement of large free floats was an important initial factor in manufacturing. Later in the twentieth century, the United States overtook France by further divorcing ownership from control. Business historians should direct their efforts to understanding why Britain was an early pioneer, with persistently wide shareholding, why America took decades to catch up, and why other countries did not build on their earlier lead. The pursuit of alternative (largely imagined) histories of national ownership differences could usefully be curtailed.

Suggested Citation

  • Leslie Hannah, 2007. "The Divorce of Ownership from Control from 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Historical Trends," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-460, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf460
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    7. Turner, John D., 2024. "Three centuries of corporate governance in the UK," QUCEH Working Paper Series 24-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    8. Miguel Á. López-Morell & José M. O'kean, 2014. "Rothschilds' strategies in international non-ferrous metals markets, 1830–1940," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(3), pages 720-749, August.
    9. Graeme G. Acheson & Christopher Coyle & David P. Jordan & John D. Turner, 2020. "Share trading activity and the rise of the rentier in the UK before 1920," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(6), pages 982-1001, August.
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    11. Bryer, Rob, 2013. "Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 3: Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 572-615.
    12. Eric Hilt, 2014. "Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts," NBER Chapters, in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 73-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Acheson, Graeme G. & Campbell, Gareth & Turner, John D., 2016. "Common law and the origin of shareholder protection," eabh Papers 16-03, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
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    15. van Hombeeck, Carlos Eduardo, 2020. "An exorbitant privilege in the first age of international financial integration?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    16. Sebastian A.J. Keibek, 2016. "Using probate data to determine historical male occupational structures," Working Papers 26, Department of Economic and Social History at the University of Cambridge, revised 21 Mar 2017.
    17. Bryer, Rob, 2013. "Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism, and the genesis of management accounting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 273-318.
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    20. Andersson, Tord & Haslam, Colin & Lee, Edward & Katechos, George & Tsitsianis, Nick, 2010. "Corporate strategy financialized: Conjuncture, arbitrage and earnings capacity in the S&P500," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 211-221.
    21. Simon Deakin, 2008. "Legal Origin, Juridical Form and Industrialisation in Historical Perspective: The Case of the Employment Contract and the Joint-Stock Company," WEF Working Papers 0042, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    22. Leslie Hannah, 2007. "What did Morgan's Men really do?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-465, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    23. Tyson, Thomas N. & Oldroyd, David & Fleischman, Richard K., 2013. "Was America born capitalist? A counter view," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 379-396.
    24. Burhop, Carsten & Chambers, David & Cheffins, Brian, 2014. "Regulating IPOs: Evidence from going public in London, 1900–1913," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 60-76.

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