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Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection

Author

Listed:
  • Munetomo Ando

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

  • Noriyuki Yanagawa

    (Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper examines development processes of a country when the degree of verifiability is endogenously determined. We characterize the development processes rigorously and show that although the efforts for improving of verifiability are important, the income distribution of a country is crucial for the effectiveness of efforts to the development processes. Moreover, this paper explains the situation where one country shows high growth rates temporally even if the technology of enforcement is poor, but eventually it experiences economic collapses.

Suggested Citation

  • Munetomo Ando & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2004. "Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-276, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf276
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1293-1317, December.
    2. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    4. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2004. "Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking, and Endogenous Inequality of Nations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 853-884, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2005. "Credit Market Imperfections and Patterns of International Trade and Capital Flows," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 714-723, 04/05.
    2. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2004. "Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking, and Endogenous Inequality of Nations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 853-884, May.
    3. Ryo Horii & Ryoji Ohdoi & Kazuhiro Yamamoto, 2005. "Finance, Technology and Inequality in Economic Development," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-08-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Aug 2005.
    4. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:141:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kerstin Gerling, 2008. "The Real Consequences of Financial Market Integration when Countries Are Heterogeneous," Working Papers 141, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).

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