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An implementation approach to rotation programs

Author

Listed:
  • Ville Korpela

    (Turku School of Economics, University of Turku)

  • Michele Lombardi

    (University of Liverpool Management School, Liverpool, UK; Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Napoli Federico II)

  • Riccardo D. Saulle

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova)

Abstract

We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation of efficient rules in rotation programs. Moreover, we show that the conditions fully characterize the class of implementable multi-valued and efficient rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021. "An implementation approach to rotation programs," Discussion Papers 150, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp150
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2020. "A market design approach to job rotation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 180-192.
    2. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rotation Programs; Job Rotation; Assignment Problems; Implementation; rights structures; Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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