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The Influence of Secrecy on the Communication Structure of Covert Networks

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  • Lindelauf, R.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Hamers, H.J.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Lindelauf, R. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2008. "The Influence of Secrecy on the Communication Structure of Covert Networks," Other publications TiSEM b8d10ab3-47f7-481f-9d0b-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b8d10ab3-47f7-481f-9d0b-f540f923e238
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindelauf, R. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2008. "On Heterogeneous Covert Networks," Other publications TiSEM f3e01f8a-65e0-4c0f-95db-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Lindelauf, R. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2010. "One-Mode Projection Analysis and Design of Covert Affiliation Networks," Discussion Paper 2010-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Husslage, B.G.M. & Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2012. "Leaderless Covert Networks : A Quantitative Approach," Discussion Paper 2012-057, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Husslage, B.G.M., 2011. "Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks : The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda," Discussion Paper 2011-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Lindelauf, R. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2009. "Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption," Discussion Paper 2009-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Husslage, B.G.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Burg, T. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Lindelauf, R., 2014. "Ranking Terrorists in Networks : A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack," Other publications TiSEM 191548ed-34ba-4aba-abbf-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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