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The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games

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  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Vermeulen, D.
  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strategies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes can be derived when the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
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Suggested Citation

  • Borm, P.E.M. & Vermeulen, D. & Voorneveld, M., 1998. "The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games," Other publications TiSEM 54baf13b-b47f-419c-bdfb-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:54baf13b-b47f-419c-bdfb-c05034f90117
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-794, July.
    2. D. Blackwell, 2010. "An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 466, David K. Levine.
    3. Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H. & van den Aarssen, J.C.M., 1988. "Pareto equilibria in multiobjective games," Other publications TiSEM a02573c0-8c7e-409d-bc75-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. L. S. Shapley & Fred D. Rigby, 1959. "Equilibrium points in games with vector payoffs," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 57-61, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. I. Nishizaki & T. Notsu, 2007. "Nondominated Equilibrium Solutions of a Multiobjective Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Game and Corresponding Mathematical Programming Problem," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 135(2), pages 217-239, November.
    2. Yasuo Sasaki, 2019. "Rationalizability in multicriteria games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 673-685, June.
    3. Natalia Novikova & Irina Pospelova, 2022. "Germeier’s Scalarization for Approximating Solution of Multicriteria Matrix Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, December.
    4. Luisa Monroy & Amparo M. Mármol & Victoriana Rubiales, 2005. "A bargaining model for finite n-person multi-criteria games," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2005/21, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    5. A. Zapata & A. M. Mármol & L. Monroy & M. A. Caraballo, 2019. "A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 415-432, April.
    6. Tim Schulteis & Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2007. "Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 373-384, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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