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Security Strategies and Equilibria in Multiobjective Matrix Games

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  • Faustino Acosta Ortega
  • Carlos Rafels Pallarola

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

Suggested Citation

  • Faustino Acosta Ortega & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2005. "Security Strategies and Equilibria in Multiobjective Matrix Games," Working Papers in Economics 128, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005128
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H. & van den Aarssen, J.C.M., 1988. "Pareto equilibria in multiobjective games," Other publications TiSEM a02573c0-8c7e-409d-bc75-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Rass & Sandra König & Stefan Schauer, 2022. "Games over Probability Distributions Revisited: New Equilibrium Models and Refinements," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-26, December.

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